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STANDING TO INVOKE ORIGINAL
SUPREME COURT JURISDICTION-
MARYLAND V. LOUISIANA
Litigants seeking to adjudicate constitutional controversies in the federal
courts must establish that they have standing to sue.' Standing is a
threshold requirement2 that a litigant must satisfy by demonstrating a per-
sonal stake in the outcome of the controversy.' In determining the requisite
personal stake, courts focus upon two questions. A court must determine
whether the litigant has suffered actual injury4 and whether there is a causal
connection between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct.,
1. The doctrine of standing involves the litigant's relationship to the subject matter of the
controversy. The underlying policies of the standing doctrine were summarized by Professors
Hart and Wechsler as follows:
[T]he question of standing in this sense is the question whether the litigant has a
sufficient personal interest in getting the relief he seeks, or is a sufficiently ap-
propriate representative of other interested persons, to warrant giving him the
relief, if he establishes the illegality alleged-and, by the same token, to warrant
recognizing him as entitled to invoke the court's decision on the issue of illegality.
P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL
COURT'S AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 156 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as HART & WECHSLER].
2. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 260-61 (1977)
(standing is a jurisdictional issue, therefore, it must be treated as a threshold matter); Linda
R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 616 (1973) (the threshold question of standing must be
answered before the merits of the claim are considered). Contra, Tushnet, The New Law of
Standing: A Plea for Abandonment, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 663, 663-64 (1977) (the law of stand-
ing is a surrogate for decisions on the merits).
3. The essence of the standing doctrine is "whether the plaintiff has 'alleged such a per-
sonal stake in the outcome of the controversy' as to warrant his invocation of federal court
jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court's remedial powers on his behalf." Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
4. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 92 (1968). According to Flast, standing exists when a
plaintiff alleges that the challenged action has caused him injury-in-fact. For purposes of
standing, actual injury generally has been economic in nature, but it need not be. See, e.g.,
United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973)
(standing exists when injury-in-fact arose out of environmental damage); Association of Data
Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970) (actual injury may be aesthetic,
conservational, or recreational as well as economic). Cf. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S.
166, 179-80 (1974) (recognition of new forms of injury does not remove the requirement of
establishing actual injury); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738 (1972) (broadening
categories of injury does not support abandonment of establishing actual injury).
5. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973). The causation component requires
that a plaintiff allege actual injury resulting from the challenged action before a court will ad-
judicate the controversy. See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438
U.S. 59, 74-78 (1978) (injury from thermal pollution attributable to the construction of nuclear
power plants); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 42 (1976) (actual injury
due to plaintiff's inability to afford hospital service and not from the challenged conduct of
defendant hospital); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 509 (1975) (injury caused by a city or-
dinance was no more than an incidental adverse effect).
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In some cases, however, it appears that the standing determination is
made without consistent application of this two-pronged analysis.6 When
this occurs,7 principled application of the standing doctrine becomes more
difficult.' A recent example of inaccurate application of the standing doc-
trine occurred in Maryland v. Louisiana.' In Maryland, the Supreme Court
manipulated the standing doctrine to invalidate Louisiana's suspect "First-
Use Tax" imposed on natural gas brought into Louisiana. 0 Because the
6. See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 74-75
(1978). In Duke Power, the substantive issue was whether the Price-Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2210(c), (e) (1976), a federal statute limiting the recovery available to victims of a nuclear
disaster, violated the fifth amendment due process rights of potential victims to whom the Act
might apply. Neither an actual or a threatened disaster had triggered the suit, nor was there any
prospect that the statutory limitation would soon, if ever, be applied. Yet a federal district court
declared the statutory limitation unconstitutional. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed on the
merits, affirming the constitutionality of the Act. For an in-depth analysis of Duke Power's im-
plications on the doctrine of standing, see Varat, Variable Justiciability and the Duke Power
Case, 58 TEX. L. REV. 273 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Varat].
Commentators concur that the Court often considers factors beyond the injury/causation
analysis in deciding standing questions. These commentators, however, divide sharply over the
nature of variable standing analyses. Id. at 308. For example, Professor Bickel approved of the
Supreme Court's inconsistent and discretionary use of standing principles. Bickel contended
that the Court maintains integrity by utilizing a flexible standing analysis because this judicial
mechanism allows the Court to withhold judgment on the merits. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH 111-98 (1962). In response to Bickel's analysis, Professor Gunther warned
of the dangers to our judicial system created by variable standing determinations. Because a
denial of standing allows the Supreme Court to avoid a judgment on the merits without ex-
plicit explanation, the doctrine is easily manipulated. Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the
"Passive Virtues"-A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM.
L. REV. 1, 9-16, 18-20 (1964). Professor Varat articulated that not only may the Supreme
-Court avoid constitutional decision through variable standing analysis, but also the Court may
embrace constitutional decisions. He suggests, however, that this wide range of judicial discre-
tion spoils the Court's appearance of neutrality. Varat, supra, at 316, 319 (emphasis in
original).
7. Compare Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (no standing to sue because plaintiffs
failed to show that injury was fairly attributable to the challenged ordinance rather than to
other factors) and Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973) (mother of illegitimate child
denied standing because injury due to criminal statute requiring child support from fathers of
legitimate children but not from fathers of illegitimate children was only speculative) with
United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedure, 412 U.S. 669 (1973) (en-
vironmental group had standing to challenge administrative action because it would cause
serious environmental damage).
8. See Davis, Standing, 1976, 72 Nw. L. REV. 69, 69-70 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Stand-
ing, 1976]. Because the law of standing is often decisive of litigation it is vital that lower
courts and practitioners receive Supreme Court guidance. The Court, however, has decided the
major standing decisions with differing analyses. These inconsistent decisions, taken together,
confuse future standing determinations. Id.
9. __ U.S.__ , 101 S.Ct. 2114 (1981).
10. Id. at 2123-25. Maryland v. Louisiana involved whether Louisiana's First-Use Tax im-
posed on natural gas brought into Louisiana violated the supremacy clause and the interstate
commerce clause of the Constitution. See notes 62-67 and accompanying text infra. For a
general discussion of the constitutionality of Louisiana's First-Use Tax, see Comment, The
Louisiana First-Use Tax: Does It Violate the Commerce Clause?, 53 TuL. L. REV. 1474 (1979).
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Maryland Court's standing analysis was inaccurate, the decision aggravates
the confusion already surrounding the standing doctrine."
In addition, the seriousness of the Maryland Court's vague standing deci-
sion is compounded because the plaintiff was a state seeking to sue another
state.2 Suits between states are within the Supreme Court's exclusive
original jurisdiction. " Because this jurisdiction is exclusive, the Supreme
Court is required to adjudicate suits between states if the claim represents a
justiciable controversy.' 4 The Maryland Court's reasoning, however, inti-
mated that exclusive original jurisdiction may not be obligatory.
A critical examination of the Maryland decision exposes significant
weaknesses in the Court's opinion. These deficiencies result from the
Court's inconsistent application of the standing causation component and
from its unwarranted discretionary analysis to invoke exclusive original
jurisdiction. In view of these deficiencies, the Maryland decision may exa-
cerbate the already confused application of the standing doctrine and may
result in arbitrary invocation of the Court's exclusive original jurisdiction.
BACKGROUND
Standing to Sue
Standing, a component of the justiciability doctrine," permits courts to
Although the Louisiana statute was held to be unconstitutional, 101 S.Ct. at 2136, the illegality
of the statute does not of itself give the Court the power to declare the act invalid. Judicial review
of suspect statutes must be within case or controversy requirements. "Unconstitutional statutes
there may be, but unless they are involved in a case properly susceptible of judicial determina-
tion, the courts have no power to pronounce that they are unconstitutional." C. WRIGHT,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 39 (3d ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT].
11. Vague and unarticulated standing determinations cause substantial costs. Damage to
the Supreme Court's appearance of neutrality and sacrifice to predictable and clear standing
decisions are the most obvious costs. See Varat, supra note 6, at 319. See also notes 102-14
and accompanying text infra.
12. 101 S.Ct. at 2118.
13. The current statute regulating original Supreme Court jurisdiction provides in pertinent
part: "The Supreme Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies
between two or more states." 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (Supp. I1 1979). See notes 44-56 and ac-
companying text infra.
14. The significance of original Supreme Court jurisdiction in the distribution of federal
judicial power was recognized by Alexander Hamilton who stated:
The Supreme Court is to be invested with original jurisdiction [in all controver-
sies which] are so directly connected with the public peace, that as well for the
preservation of this, as out of respect to the sovereigntie6 they represent, it is both
expedient and proper that such questions should be submitted in the first instance
to the highest judicatory of the nation.
THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 510-11 (A. Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 1961). For a general discus-
sion of original Supreme Court jurisdiction see, Note, The Original Jurisdiction of the United
States Supreme Court, 11 STAN. L. REV. 665 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Original Jurisdiction].
15. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 98 (1968) (because standing is an aspect of justiciability
it is surrounded by the complexities and uncertainties that inhere in justiciability). Justiciability is
the concept employed to give expression to the limitation placed upon federal courts by the
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consider only concrete cases or controversies."' The law of standing is
designed to ensure that only litigants with a genuine interest can participate
in a proceeding. The threshold standing issue requires a court to determine
whether the litigant has suffered actual injury, and whether a causal con-
nection exists between the wrongful act and the claimed injury. 7
The essential element of the standing determination, therefore, is whether
actual injury has been sustained. Although proof of actual injury does not
usually present difficulties,' 8 the analysis is problematic when a state is a
litigant. A state, because of its dual role as a sovereign and a proprietor,
can allege injury-in-fact under two theories. 9 Usually, a state seeking to file
case or controversy doctrine. The doctrine's limitations are illustrated by various concepts. For
example, a controversy is nonjusticiable when the parties seek to adjudicate a political ques-
tion, when the parties ask for an advisory opinion, when the parties do not have standing to
maintain an action, or when the question sought to be adjudicated has been mooted by subse-
quent developments. Id. at 95 (footnotes omitted).
In Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975), Justice Powell's majority opinion stated that there
are two components of justiciability. There is the constitutional component which is grounded
in the article Ill case or controversy provision. See note 16 infra. The second aspect is the
prudential component which is not mandated by the Constitution, but is a discretionary ele-
ment established by the Court as a matter of judicial self-governance. Warth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. 490, 498-502 (1975).
Professor Tribe observed that the "[jiusticiability doctrine is peculiarly self-regarding," and
is "in an important sense the description of an institutional psychology: an account of how the
federal courts, or more accurately the Justices of the Supreme Court, view their own role." L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-7, at 53 (1978) [hereinafter cited as TRIBE].
16. U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2. The article III case or controversy requirement dictates the
manner in which constitutional issues must arise if they are to be addressed by the federal
courts. Article III provides:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies be-
tween two or more States;-between Citizens of different States;-between a State
and Citizens of another State;-between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands
under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and
foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
Id. See generally Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the "Case or
Controversy" Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297 (1979).
In terms of article II1, the standing determination is essential to ensure that the action is in-
stituted by the proper party, thus assuring an adversary proceeding. An adversary interest en-
sures full and proper presentation of the issues facing the court. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395
U.S. 411, 423 (1969). For a comprehensive analysis of the doctrine of standing, see HART &
WECHSLER, supra note 1, at 150-214.
17. See notes 2-5 and accompanying text supra.
18. If A and B are parties and A hurts B, B has standing to litigate the legality of A's
action. Whether interests deserve legal protection depends upon whether public policy warrants
protection of the interests. Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 450,
468 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Liberalized Law].
19. The burden on a state as a litigant is greater than that required of a plaintiff in private
litigation. The Supreme Court has required that states must show by "clear and convincing
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an action sues to protect its own interests in its capacity as proprietor.2" The
actual injury inquiry is whether the state can prove injury to its economy,2
financial obligations," property, 3 or other sovereign concerns.2"
A state may also sue in its capacity as parens patriae. 5 A state satisfies
this requirement by proving that the suit is to protect the general health,
comfort, and welfare of its citizens.26 Accordingly, parens patriae standing
evidence" that the injuries are of "serious magnitude." California v. Texas, 437 U.S. 601, 614
(1978) (citing Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 521 (1906)).
20. Proprietary capacity standing is a settled doctrine that grants a state standing to sue
only when it is the real party in interest. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 1, at 270. See Hawaii
v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972) (state allowed standing to sue for an injury to its
economy attributable to a violation of an antitrust law); Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183
(1968) (state allowed to bring an action challenging the Fair Labor Standards Act as applied to
its schools and hospitals). But see Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660 (1976) (state
denied standing because there was no showing that defendant state's tax plan caused plaintiff
state any injury); Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U.S. 1 (1939) (complaining state did not suf-
fer a wrong due to the action of the other state, thus standing did not exist). See also TRIBE,
supra note 25, § 3-24, at 101-02.
21. See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972) (state allowed to seek redress for
damage to economy due to an antitrust violation); Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439
(1945) (state allowed to bring an action for wrong suffered by the state as the owner of a
railroad).
22. See Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 U.S. 565 (1918) (state granted standing to recover a
debt due from another state); South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286 (1904) (state had
standing to secure nonpayment of bonds by the other debtor state).
23. See New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 363 (1976) (state had standing to seek bound-
ary dispute determination); New Jersey v. New York, 345 U.S. 369 (1953) (state allowed to in-
itiate suit concerning the distribution of water rights); Arizona v. California, 298 U.S. 558
(1936) (state allowed to bring action for judicial apportionment concerning state boundary).
24. See Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923) (state initiated suit to enjoin
enforcement of another state's statute threatening to cut off supply of natural gas); Missouri v.
Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901) (state had standing to challenge discharge of sewage into
Mississippi River).
25. The term parens patriae literally means parent of the country and traditionally refers to
the role of the state as sovereign and guardian of persons under its protection. Hawaii v. Stan-
dard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257-60 (1972). See, e.g., Gibbs v. Titelman, 369 F. Supp. 38, 54
(E.D. Pa. 1973) (Pennsylvania granted standing to intervene under the doctrine of parens
patriae to protect the welfare of citizens). But see, e.g., Board of Supervisors v. United States,
408 F. Supp. 556, 566 (E.D. Va. 1976) (county was not a sovereign but rather a political sub-
division and thus could not assert rights of its citizens on the theory of parens patriae).
The expansion of the parens patriae concept developed through a series of cases involving
the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. In deciding these suits, the Supreme Court acted as
an arbiter between quasi-sovereign interests. See Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439
(1945) (state protecting citizens from continuing economic wrong); Georgia v. Tennessee Cop-
per Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907) (state protecting citizens from the discharge of noxious gas);
Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901) (state protecting citizens from the discharge of sewage
into the Mississippi River). For a general discussion of the parens patriae concept, see Curtis,
The Checkered Career of Parens Patriae: The State as Parent or Tyrant?, 25 DEPAUL L. REV.
895 (1976). For a discussion of parens patriae as it relates to state party original jurisdiction,
see Original Jurisdiction, supra note 14, at 671-80.
26. See Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 19 (1900) (Louisiana, in its capacity as parens
patriae, presented a claim as trustee, guardian, and representative of all its citizens). Cf. In re
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focuses on the extent to which a state's interests are commensurate with its
citizens' interests.27 Generally, a state invokes parens patriae standing when
the extent of damages available to its citizens would be wholly inadequate
or disproportionate in relation to litigation costs.28
Although actual injury may be difficult to substantiate, an even greater
burden is establishing a causal connection between the claimed injury and
the challenged conduct. Because the causal connection determination has
been confused by unsuccessful attempts to formulate a standard causation
principle, it has been deemed the most difficult component of standing.29
The first test delineated by the Supreme Court to explain the causation
element of standing was the "legal interest" test.3 0 This test prescribed that
direct injury was not recognizable unless the right invaded was "one of
property, one arising out of contract, one protected against tortious inva-
sion, or one founded on a statute which confers a privilege." 3' The legal in-
terest test was later specifically rejected by the Court because the test focus-
ed on the merits of the case instead of the threshold standing considera-
tions. 2
After discarding the "legal interest" test, the Court formulated a more
liberal "zone of interest" test to determine whether a sufficient nexus be-
tween the claimed injury and the challenged conduct existed.33 This test re-
quired that the litigant's interest be arguably within the zone of interest to
be protected by the statutory or constitutional provision from which the
Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895). In Debs, the Court stated that "the obligations which (the govern-
ment] is under to promote interest of all, and to prevent the wrongdoing of one resulting in in-
jury to the general welfare, is often of itself sufficient to give it a standing in court." Id. at
584.
27. Original Jurisdiction, supra note 14, at 671.
28. See Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241 (1901) (substantial impairment of health and
prosperity of state's general population without the citizens being able to seek adequate judicial
relief is basis for state to invoke parens patriae standing).
29. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 74 (1978)
(compared to the requirement of actual injury the requirement of establishing a causal connec-
tion is the more difficult standing inquiry).
30. Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 306 U.S. 118, 137-38 (1939).
This early causation inquiry was restrictive because it required interference with a legal interest
as a prerequisite to adjudication. See Liberalized Law, supra note 18, at 452-53. Professor
Wright expressed criticism for the legal interest test: "Such an approach is demonstrably cir-
cular: if the plaintiff is given standing to assert his claims, his interest is legally protected; if he
is denied standing, his interest is not legally protected." WRIGHT, supra note 10, at 47.
31. Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 306 U.S. 118, 137-38 (1939)
(public utility companies' property and rights were not destroyed, they were held to have no
legal interest to challenge the constitutionality of a TVA related program).
32. See Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970) (legal interest test
concerns matters quite distinct from the question of standing).
33. Id. The Supreme Court formulated and applied the "zone of interest" test in Data
Processing. In Data Processing, the issue was whether the petitioners, an organization of data
processing services, had standing to challenge a ruling of the Comptroller of the Currency
allowing national banks to sell data processing services to customers. A unanimous Court
determined that the petitioners had standing to sue. Id. at 153-58.
[Vol. 31:227
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claim arose."' The "zone of interest" test, however, has not been applied
by the Court since its inception.35
Although the "zone of interest" test was never explicitly rejected, the
Supreme Court has articulated alternative tests to establish the causation
element of standing. In Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights
Organization,3 6 the Court formulated the "fair traceable" causal connection
test. This test permits a court to hear only those suits where the alleged in-
jury fairly can be traced to the challenged action of the defendant, and not
injury that results from the independent action of some third party not
before the court.37 Unlike the "zone of interest" test, the fairly traceable
causation analysis has been utilized by the Supreme Court in recent stand-
ing decisions.38
In an effort to formulate a more exacting causation test, the Court, in
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group,39 developed a
"but for" test."' The inquiry under this most recent causation analysis is
whether there is a substantial likelihood that the challenged action is a "but
for cause of the litigants' claimed injury." ' The precise application of the
34. Id. at 153 (protecting nonbank data processors from bank competition of data process-
ing services was within the zone of interest of the Bank Service Corporation Act of 1962, 12
U.S.C. § 1864 (1976). See also Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970) (companion case to Data
Processing in which the Court also applied the zone of interest test).
35. This benign neglect has caused some commentators to suggest that the zone of interest
test has, in effect, been rejected. See Standing, 1976, supra note 8, at 81; Scott, Standing in
the Supreme Court-A Functional Analysis, 86 HARV. L. REV. 645, 662-69 (1973); The
Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92 HARV. L. REV. 253, 260 (1978).
36. 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
37. Id. at 41-42. In Simon, the plaintiffs were indigents who were denied hospital service
because of their inability to pay immediately for the service. The plaintiffs challenged an IRS
Revenue Ruling that discontinued a requirement that hospitals must provide below cost service
to indigents. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs failed to show that the denial of ser-
vice resulted from the revenue ruling. In examining the causal connection, the Court concluded
that it was "speculative whether the denials of service specified in the complaint fairly can be
traced to [the ruling] or instead result from decisions made by the hospitals without regard to
the tax implications." Id. at 41-42.
38. See, e.g., Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977)
(an association may have standing to assert the claims of its members even where it has suf-
fered no injury from the challenged activity); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 261 (1977) (complaint must indicate that the injury is indeed fairly
traceable to the defendant's acts or omissions).
39. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
40. Id. at 72-81. In Duke Power, an action was brought by an environmental organization
seeking a declaration of unconstitutionality of the Price-Anderson Act which placed a limita-
tion on the maximum amount of liability for damages resulting from a nuclear accident involv-
ing atomic power plants. The Supreme Court held that residents near nuclear power plants had
standing to challenge the Act's constitutionality. The Court reasoned that several immediate
adverse effects of construction of the plants fulfilled the injury-in-fact requirement such as
pollution of lakes and loss of aesthetic beauty. Further, the Court acknowledged that "but
for" the Price-Anderson Act the nuclear power plants would not have been built, and thus a
sufficient causal connection existed. Id. at 72-78.
41. Id. at 74-78. The district court that heard the Duke Power controversy developed the
1981]
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"but for" test is unsettled because the Supreme Court delineated this new
test without redefining the status of the fairly traceable test of causation.42
In light of a state's dual capacity to bring a lawsuit, and the two-pronged
standing inquiry, the issue of state standing is extremely complex. Once a
state's standing to sue is established, however, the legal difficulties are not
fully resolved. The issue of Supreme Court jurisdiction over the subject
matter poses an additional problem because appropriate jurisdiction
depends upon the status of the state's opponent.
Original Supreme Court Jurisdiction
Article III of the Constitution divides federal judicial authority between
the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts.43 The Constitution further
provides that the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction in all cases affect-
ing ambassadors or other public ministers and in all cases in which a state is
a party.44 The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, however, is not
exclusive by virtue of article II1. Within the categories enumerated in article
Ill, Congress may provide for or deny exclusiveness of original actions. 5
An action under nonexclusive original jurisdiction can be brought in either
a lower federal court or in the Supreme Court because the Court's jurisdic-
tion is concurrent with the lower federal court's jurisdiction.4 6 In an ex-
"but for" test which the Supreme Court upheld. See Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc. v.
United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 431 'F. Supp. 203 (W.D.N.C. 1977). The district court
decision was appealed directly to the Supreme Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1976)
which provides for direct appeal to the Supreme Court from any decision invalidating an Act
of Congress in any suit in which the United States, its agencies, officers, or employees are par-
ties. 438 U.S. at 68.
42. 438 U.S. at 74.
43. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § I. Article III provides: "The judicial Power of the United
States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish." Id.
44. Section two of article III provides: "In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have
original Jurisdiction." Id. § 2, cl. 2.
45. See Ames v. Kansas, Ill U.S. 449, 463-69 (1884). In Ames, the Supreme Court stated:
In view of the practical construction put on this provision of the Constitution by
Congress at the very moment of the organization of the government, and of the
significant fact that from 1789 until now no court of the United States has ever in
its actual adjudications determined to the contrary, we are unable to say that it is
not within the power of Congress to grant to the inferior courts of the United
States jurisdiction in cases where the Supreme Court has been vested by the Con-
stitution with original jurisdiction.
Id. at 469.
46. From the enactment of the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress has had the power to make
the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction concurrent with the jurisdiction of the lower federal
courts. See notes 48-49 and accompanying text infra. For examples of the exercise of nonex-
clusive original Supreme Court jurisdiction, see United States v. Nevada, 412 U.S. 534 (1973)
(controversy between the United States and two states); Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S.
91 (1972) (action by a state against citizens of another state).
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clusive original action, however, the Supreme Court is the only federal
forum in which the parties can litigate the controversy. 47
Although the Constitution does not distinguish between exclusive and
nonexclusive Supreme Court jurisdiction, the Judiciary Act of 1789 arti-
culated the distinction. 8 The 1789 Act provided that the Supreme Court
shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all controversies, of a civil
nature, where a state is a party, except in cases between a state and its
citizens or between a state and citizens of another state. 9 In the latter cases
the Court had nonexclusive original jurisdiction. 0
The current statute providing for original Supreme Court jurisdiction
maintains the distinction between exclusive and nonexclusive original
jurisdiction.' Under this statute, however, the only remaining area of ex-
clusive original actions involves suits between states. 2 Consequently,
47. See United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621 (1892). In Texas, the Supreme Court stressed
that cases under exclusive original jurisdiction should be determined in the highest tribunal of
the nation to ensure that jurisdiction comports with the dignity of the parties. Id. at 643. But
see Arizona v. New Mexico, 425 U.S. 794 (1976). In Arizona, the Supreme Court declined to
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction because a pending state court action provided an alter-
native forum for the litigation of the issues. Id. at 797.
48. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 80 (1789) (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a) (Supp. III 1979)). For a historical account of the first Judiciary Act see J. GOEBEL,
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801
457-508 (1971).
49. The Judiciary Act distinguished between those instances in which original jurisdiction
was exclusive of other courts and those in which it was not exclusive. The Act provided:
That the Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies of a
civil nature, where a state is a party, except between a state and its citizens; and
except also between a state and citizens of other states, or aliens, in which latter
case it shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction. (b.) And shall have ex-
clusively all such jurisdiction of suits or proceedings against ambassadors, or other
public ministers or their domestics, or domestic servants, as a court of law can
have or exercise consistently with the law of nations; and original, but not ex-
clusive jurisdiction of all suits brought by ambassadors, or other public ministers,
or in which a consul, or vice consul, shall be a party.
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 80 (1789) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1251
(1976)).
50. Id.
51. See 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). The current statute regulating Supreme
Court original jurisdiction presents the distinction between exclusive and nonexclusive original
jurisdiction. The statute provides in full:
(a) The Supreme Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all con-
troversies between two or more states.
(b) The Supreme Court shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of:
(1) All actions or proceedings to which ambassadors, other public ministers, con-
suls, or vice consuls of foreign states are parties;
(2) All controversies between the United States and a State;
(3) All actions or proceedings by a State against the citizens of another State or
against aliens.
Id.
52. The statute regulating original Supreme Court jurisdiction was amended in 1978 to
grant concurrent power to the lower federal courts to hear suits involving ambassadors or
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justiciable suits between states are adjudicated for the first time before the
Supreme Court. 3 In these original actions the Supreme Court necessarily
assumes the role of a trial court.5 4 Because the Supreme Court is ill-
equipped to function as a trial court, the Court narrowed the scope of its
nonexclusive original jurisdiction by allowing discretionary review in con-
troversies that only have one state as a party.55 The discretionary limitation
is the availability of an alternative forum in which the controversy can be
adjudicated, thus allowing the Supreme Court to attend to its other func-
tions. 6
This discretionary element, however, historically was not applied to the
Supreme Court's exercise of exclusive original actions. Instead, the Court
relied only upon the constitutional doctrine of justiciability which is
employed to give expression to the limitations placed upon federal courts by
other public ministers. The statute was amended so that the Supreme Court would not be
burdened with such litigation on its original docket. Id. Congress concluded that there was no
justification for continuing to vest original and exclusive jurisdiction in the Supreme Court in
those instances when foreign ambassadors, members of diplomatic missions, or members of
their families are subject to litigation. See Diplomatic Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 95-393, § 8(b),
92 Stat. 810 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (Supp. 1II 1979)). Thus, the only remaining category
of exclusive original actions involves suits between states, 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (Supp. III 1979).
53. The Supreme Court is both the first and final arbiter of controversies arising within its
exclusive original jurisdiction. Cf. Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 519-20 (1906) (questioning
the wisdom of the Supreme Court as the only forum available for a controversy between
states).
54. In original actions, the Supreme Court is liberal in allowing full development of the
facts because the controversies usually involve issues of great importance. United States v.
Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 715 (1950). Although the Supreme Court must assume the role of a trial
court, the Court can appoint a special master to alleviate some of the burden. FED. R. Civ. P.
53. Although the issues raised in original cases are of significance, the number of original cases
on the Supreme Court's docket each term is comparatively small. Original Jurisdiction, supra
note 14, at 665.
55. See Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U.S. 1, 19 (1939) (nonexclusive action dismissed
because lower federal court had concurrent jurisdiction). In Massachusetts, the Supreme Court
recognized "the need [for] the exercise of a sound discretion in order to protect this Court
from an abuse of the opportunity to resort to its original jurisdiction in the enforcement by
States of claims against citizens of other States." Id.
56. See Ohio v. Wyandotte Chem. Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 498 (1971). Stressing the appellate
role of the Supreme Court and the inappropriate structure of the Court for hearing original ac-
tions, the Wyandotte Court delineated limitations on nonexclusive original actions. The
Supreme Court acknowledged that it may decline to hear original nonexclusive cases only
when:
(1) declination of jurisdiction would not disserve any of the principal policies
underlying the Article Ill jurisdictional grant and (2) the reasons of practical
wisdom that persuade us that this Court is an inappropriate forum are consistent
with the proposition that our discretion is legitimated by its use to keep this aspect
of the Court's functions attuned with its other responsibilities.
Id. at 499. See also Washington v. General Motors Corp., 406 U.S. 109 (1972). Citing Wyan-
dotte, the Washington Court emphasized that the grant of nonexclusive original jurisdiction
should be discretionary so that the Court's ability to administer its appellate docket would not
be impaired. Id. at 113.
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article MI." Consequently, when an exclusive original action is before the
Supreme Court, the Court is obligated to exercise jurisdiction if the matter
is justiciable." Despite the Supreme Court's responsibility to hear justiciable
exclusive original actions, the Court recently developed a discretionary
analysis in an exclusive original action.5 9 Although such discretion is unwar-
ranted, the Court utilized this discretionary analysis again in the Maryland
decision.
THE MARYLAND DECISION AND RATIONALE
In 1978, the State of Louisiana imposed a tax upon certain first "uses"
of natural gas within its borders.6" The First-Use Tax statute affixed a
charge of seven cents per thousand cubic feet of natural gas.6 The statute
taxed natural gas obtained from the Outer Continental Shelf that was piped
into processing plants in Louisiana and eventually sold to out-of-state con-
sumers.6" The tax was levied on the interstate pipeline companies because
57. See notes 15-16 and accompanying text supra.
58. The Supreme Court has exclusive original jurisdiction to adjudicate a controversy so long
as "the issue framed by the pleadings constitutes a justiciable 'case' or 'controversy' within the
meaning of the Constitutional provisions." Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398, 405 (1939). To con-
stitute a justiciable controversy, "it must appear that the complaining State has suffered a wrong
through the action of the other State, furnishing ground for judicial redress ... " Massachusetts
v. Missouri, 308 U.S. 1, 15 (1939). See, e.g., Idaho ex rel. Evans v. Oregon, 444 U.S. 380 (1980)
(Idaho claim seeking equitable apportionment of various runs of migrating fish presented a
justiciable controversy).
59. Arizona v. New Mexico, 425 U.S. 794 (1976) (per curiam). In Arizona, the Supreme
Court exercised discretion in adjudicating original jurisdiction even though the jurisdiction was
exclusive. Relying on nonexclusive original jurisdiction decisions, the Arizona opinion declined
to invoke exclusive original jurisdiction in a suit between two states. Id. at 796 (citing Illinois
v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972)); Washington v. General Motors Corp., 406 U.S. 109
(1972); Ohio v. Wyandotte Chem. Corp., 401 U.S. 493 (1971)). The Arizona Court's reliance
on these cases was unfounded because fundamental differences exist between exclusive and
nonexclusive original jurisdiction. See notes 51-52 and accompanying text supra.
60. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 47:1301-:1307, :1351 (West Supp. 1981). Energy producing
states desire control over the amount and manner of production, the compensation for the
depletion of their energy resources, the compensation for damage to the environment, and for
the socio-economic problems associated with energy production. These states often attempt to
achieve these goals through taxation. Note, The Effect and Validity of State Taxation of
Energy Resources, 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 345, 346 (1980).
61. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:1303(B) (West Supp. 1981). Under the First-Use Tax statute
the term "use" includes:
the sale; the transportation in the state to the point of delivery at the inlet of any
processing plant; the transportation in the state of unprocessed natural gas to the
point of delivery at the inlet of any measurement or storage facility; transfer of
possession or relinquishment of control at a delivery point in the state; processing
for the extraction of liquefiable component products or waste materials; use in
manufacturing; treatment; or other ascertainable action at a point within the state.
Id. § :1302 (8).
62. Two Louisiana statutes provided tax credit for in-state producers of natural gas and for
state owned natural gas distribution services. Id. §§ 47:11(B), :647. Because these exemptions
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they had title to the natural gas when the first use occurred in Louisiana.63
To remedy the pipeline companies' tax burden, the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission allowed the pipeline companies to increase their
rates, thereby passing the tax burden on to the consumers of natural gas.6 '
Subsequently, eight states6 filed a motion to the Supreme Court for leave
to file a complaint within the Court's original jurisdiction. 6 The plaintiff
states in their proprietary and parens patriae capacities sought a declaratory
judgment that Louisiana's First-Use Tax was unconstitutional on the
grounds that the tax interfered with interstate commerce and violated the
supremacy clause.67 Because the claim involved a dispute between sovereign
states, the action was within the statutory exclusive original jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court. 68 After the Court granted the plaintiff states' motion
for leave to file an original action, 9 the State of Louisiana moved to dis-
miss the case on the ground that the states lacked sufficient standing to in-
voke exclusive original Supreme Court jurisdiction.7"
Louisiana argued that the plaintiff states lacked standing to sue in their
proprietary capacity because the tax was imposed upon the pipeline com-
panies and not upon the plaintiff states.7 Moreover, Louisiana contended
that the plaintiff states were only remotely affected by imposition of the
tax, thus the causation component was too tenuous to grant standing. In
addition, Louisiana asserted that the plaintiff states' claim of parens patriae
standing suffered the same deficient causal connection that defeated pro-
prietary standing.7 Under Louisiana's argument, the interests of plaintiff
states did not fall within the sovereignty concerns that justify parens patriae
standing. Louisiana argued that the citizen consumers of natural gas had
no legal interest in challenging the tax when identifiable taxpayers-the
were only for Louisiana distributors of natural gas, Louisiana consumers were insulated from
increases in the price of natural gas resulting from the First-Use Tax.
63. Id. § 47:1302 (9). The State of Louisiana's alleged purpose for the First-Use Tax was to
prevent economic and physical. waste of natural energy resources, and to compensate the
citizens of Louisiana for damage to the state's waterbottom and shoreline. Id. § 47:1301.
64. Order Establishing Procedures Governing Pipeline Recovery of the State of Louisiana
First-Use Tax, 43 Fed. Reg. 45,553 (1978).
65. The states involved were Maryland, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, New
York, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin.
66. An original action in the Supreme Court must be commenced by a motion for leave to
file the initial pleading. Sup. CT. R. 9, 346 U.S. 955 (1954).
67. 101 S. Ct. at 2136.
68. See notes 47-53 and accompanying text supra.
69. Maryland v. Louisiana, 442 U.S. 937 (1979) (miscellaneous order).
70. 101 S. Ct. at 2123. See Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss
at 12-13, Maryland v. Louisiana, 101 S. Ct. 2114 (1981); Brief in Opposition to Motion for
Leave to File Complaint at 1-8, Maryland v. Louisiana, 101 S. Ct. 2114 (1981).
71. 101 S. Ct. at 2123. See note 63 and accompanying text supra.
72. 101 S. Ct. at 2123. See note 64 and accompanying text supra.
73. 101 S. Ct. at 2124.
74. See notes 25-28 and accompanying text supra.
[Vol. 31:227
MAR YLAND
pipeline companies-were capable of protecting the validity of the First-Use
Tax in the Louisiana state court system."
The Supreme Court, however, summarily rejected Louisiana's standing
argument. In holding that plaintiff states had standing to initiate a claim
against the First-Use Tax, Justice White, writing for the majority, stated
that the plaintiff states had a legal and recognizable interest in challenging
the tax in their proprietary capacity.7 6 The Maryland Court reiterated the
Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization7 holding that
standing exists if the alleged injury fairly can be traced to the action of the
defendant, and if the injury is not the result of an independant action of
some third party not before the Court. 8 Using the "fairly traceable" test,
therefore, the Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiff states, as con-
sumers of natural gas, "clearly" had proprietary standing because the tax
was intended to be passed on to the ultimate consumers. 79
Additionally, the Maryland Court held that plaintiff states had parens
patriae standing to challenge the First-Use Tax.8 0 The parens patriae deter-
mination was based on the same reasoning the Court applied in its pro-
prietary capacity determination. The Maryland Court held that the plaintiff
states' injury to their proprietary interests, as consumers of natural gas, was
a direct result of the First-Use Tax.' The Maryland Court equated plaintiff
states' proprietary injury with the citizen consumers' injury imposed by the
First-Use Tax and concluded that the citizen consumers also suffered
substantial direct harm. 2 The Maryland opinion concluded that a state may
act as the representative of its citizens when the injury substantially affects
the state's general population. 3
75. 101 S. Ct. at 2125. Two separate actions concerning the constitutionality of the First-
Use Tax had been filed in Louisiana courts. The first suit was brought by Louisiana in a state
court seeking a declaratory judgment that the First-Use Tax was constitutional. The defendant
pipeline companies removed the case to federal court; however, the case was subsequently
remanded back to the state court. Edwards v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 464 F.
Supp. 654 (M.D. La. 1979). The second challenge was a suit brought by the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission testing the constitutionality of the First-Use Tax. The case was stayed
pending a decision in the Edwards case. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. McNamara,
No. 78-384 (M.D. La., filed Sept. 29, 1978).
76. Because the consumers of natural gas were required to pay higher prices, the issue of
actual injury was evident and did not present conflict. The issue of causation between the
economic injury and the imposition of the First-Use Tax, however, posed the critical issue to
be resolved by the Maryland Court. See 101 S. Ct. at 2123-25.
77. 426 U.S. 26 (1976). See notes 36-38 and accompanying text supra.
78. 101 S. Ct. at 2123.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 2124.
81. Id. Accord, Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923). In a suit to enjoin the
enforcement of a West Virginia conservation statute threatening to cut off Pennsylvania's sup-
ply of natural gas, Pennsylvania was found to have standing as a proprietor of public institu-
tions that used natural gas. Id. at 591.
82. 101 S. Ct. at 2125.
83. Id. Accord, Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945). In a suit seeking in-
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Louisiana posed an alternative argument for dismissing the plaintiff
states' claim against the First-Use Tax. Louisiana maintained that even if
plaintiff states had standing, the Maryland case was inappropriate to be
deemed an original action."4 Although Maryland involved a suit between
sovereign states, Louisiana, relying on Arizona v. New Mexico,8" urged that
the Supreme Court not exercise exclusive original jurisdiction. In Arizona,
Arizona challenged the constitutionality of an electrical energy tax imposed
by New Mexico.86 The Supreme Court stated that the grant of exclusive
original jurisdiction was to be applied only in cases in which the claim is
serious and no proper alternative forum is available to litigate the issues. 7
The Court, therefore, declined to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in a
suit between states because a state court proceeding provided an alternative
forum. 8 Citing Arizona, Louisiana advocated that pending Louisiana state
court actions89 were appropriate alternative forums in which the specific
issues involved could be addressed. 90
Despite Louisiana's contention, the Supreme Court exercised exclusive
original jurisdiction.' Although the Court applied the Arizona discretionary
alternative forum analysis,92 the Maryland Court reached a conclusion dif-
ferent from that in Arizona."3 The Maryland opinion emphasized that ap-
propriateness of an exclusive original action must be determined on a case-
by-case basis. 9' Although the Maryland Court acknowledged factual
similarities between Maryland and Arizona, it construed significant dif-
ferences between the cases that compelled an opposite result.9'
junctive relief from increased railroad rates, Georgia was allowed to invoke the original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as parens patriae, representing the interests of its citizens.
Id. at 447-51.
84. 101 S. Ct. at 2125. See Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support at Motion to Dismiss
at 16-19, Maryland v. Louisiana, 101 S. Ct. 2114 (1981); Brief in Opposition to Motion for
Leave to File Complaint at 9-10, Maryland v. Louisiana, 101 S. Ct. 2114 (1981).
85. 425 U.S. 794 (1976) (per curiam).
86. Id. at 796.
87. Id. at 796-97 (citing Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 93-94 (1972)).
88. In Arizona, three Arizona utilities sought a declaratory judgment in the District Court
for Santa Fe County, New Mexico. Because one of the three utility companies was a political
subdivision, the Arizona Court concluded that Arizona's interests were adequately represented
in the state court proceeding. 425 U.S. at 796.
89. See note 75 supra.
90. 101 S. Ct. at 2125. See note 75 supra.
91. 101 S. Ct. at 2125-28.
92. Id. See note 59 supra.
93. The Maryland Court, although distinguishing its holding from Arizona, implicitly sus-
tained the Arizona discretionary limitation on exclusive original jurisdiction by engaging in a
discretionary analysis. Despite the factual similarities between Maryland and Arizona, the
Supreme Court focused on insubstantial distinctions to justify a contrary result. In so
distinguishing, the Maryland Court's jurisdictional determination appears arbitrary. See notes
126-38 and accompanying text infra.
94. 101 S. Ct. at 2127.
95. Id.
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In discerning these differences, the Maryland Court first recognized that
in Arizona the lower state court action directly represented plaintiff, the
State of Arizona." Conversely, in Maryland, the Court noted that the
plaintiff states were not directly represented in the Louisiana state court
proceedings. 97 In addition, the Court noted that the State of Arizona had
not suffered any injury because the tax had not yet been collected. 98 In
Maryland, however, the pipeline companies were required to pay the tax
and seek reimbursement from the consumers. 9 Finally, the Maryland Court
distinguished the Arizona decision because Maryland involved states' use of
natural gas extracted from the federally controlled Outer Continental Shelf,
thus implicating "unique concerns of federalism" not present in Arizona.' 0
The Supreme Court concluded that, despite the factual similarities between
the cases, the exercise of exclusive original jurisdiction in Maryland was fully
in accord with the purposes of its exclusive original jurisdiction.' 0 '
CRITICISM
The Standing Determination
The standing determination in Maryland reflects the Supreme Court's
continued tolerance of inconsistent standing principles. Although the stand-
ing doctrine has not posed definitional problems for the Court, the Court
has not settled on an appropriate application of the causation element of
standing. 02 In determining whether the injury was caused by the First-Use
Tax, the Maryland Court relied on the Simon "fairly traceable" test and ig-
nored the more recent Duke Power "but for" test.' 3 Although the Court's
96. Id. See note 88 supra.
97. Despite that the plaintiff states were invited to intervene, the Maryland Court stressed
that the Louisiana state court was an inappropriate forum, primarily because no injunctive
relief prior to a determination on the merits was possible under Louisiana law. 101 S. Ct. at
2127 n.19. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN §§ 47:1575-:1576 (West 1970 & Supp. 198).
98. New Mexico's procedure did not limit the utility companies from seeking a refund of
taxes already paid, but permitted the companies to refuse to pay the tax pending a declaration
of the statute's constitutionality. 101 S. Ct. at 2127 (citing Arizona v. New Mexico, 425 U.S.
794, 798 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
99. Because Louisiana law prohibited state courts from restraining collection of any tax,
Louisiana required that the First-Use Tax be paid pending a refund action. Id. See LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 47:1575 (West Supp. 1981).
100. 101 S. Ct. at 2127. Few issues of contemporary legal and political policies elicit the in-
tensity of concern as the development and production of offshore natural resources. See
Breeden, Federalism and the Development of Outer Continental Shelf Mineral Resources, 28
STAN. L. REV. 1107 (1976). Although the Louisiana tax was levied upon gas extracted from the
federally controlled Outer Continental Shelf, this issue should not be dispositive of the jurisdic-
tional ruling. See note 138 and accompanying text infra.
101. 101 S. Ct. at 2127-28.
102. See notes 29-42 and accompanying text supra.
103. 101 S. Ct. at 2123. Although the Maryland Court cited the Duke Power case, the opin-
ion did not mention the "but for" test, nor did the opinion specify any reasons for not utiliz-
ing this most recent causation analysis. See notes 39-42 and accompanying text supra.
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use of the "fairly traceable" analysis was not necessarily improper, the
absence of a rationale for its use and the absence of an explanation of the
status of the "but for" test is misleading.'" The Supreme Court has explicity
acknowledged that the causation element is the most difficult standing in-
quiry,' ° yet the Court added to the already existing legal complexities when
it inconsistently applied the causation analysis in Maryland."6 In order to
establish a solid standing causation analysis, the Court should avoid
vacillating between the various standing causation tests and delineate a
specific standing causation analysis.
Assuming that the Court's reliance upon the Simon "fairly traceable"
test was correct, the Court inadequately applied this test to the Maryland
factual situation. According to the Maryland Court, the plaintiff states
"clearly" had proprietary and parens patriae standing because, as con-
sumers, both plaintiff states and their citizens suffered economic injury-due
to the First-Use Tax.' 7 The Court held that the plaintiff states' and the
citizen consumers' economic injuries were fairly traceable to the challenged
action of Louisiana, and were not injuries that resulted from the indepen-
dent action of some third party not before the court. 00 A more exacting ap-
plication of the "fairly traceable" causation analysis, however,
demonstrates that standing does not "clearly" exist as readily as the
Maryland Court advanced.
In Maryland, the injury, arguably, resulted from the independent action
of some third party not before the court.' 9 Specifically, the plaintiff states'
standing to sue appears to be remote because the pipeline companies, with
the approval of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, passed the
104. The significance of the Maryland Court's reliance on the "fairly traceable" test and
omission,of the "but for" test is uncertain. This omission may imply that the Court has either
abandoned the test or confined it to suits that challenge specific statutes rather than to suits
that are based on general constitutional claims. The omission of the "but for" test can be
compared with the benign neglect of the zone of interest test. See note 35 supra.
105. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 74 (1978). See
note 29 supra.
106. Inconsistent application of standing principles should be avoided because such misap-
plication complicates the law of standing and creates ambiguous precedents that may cause in-
justice in later cases. Standing, 1976, supra note 8, at 81. Compare Duke Power Co. v. Caro-
lina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978) (standing to challenge Price-Anderson Act)
with Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976) (no standing to challenge
IRS Revenue Ruling) and Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (no standing to challenge a city .
ordinance). Professor Varat suggests that Duke Power is inconsistent with Simon and Warth.
This inconsistency, he believes, risks breeding cynicism, as well as a perception of the Supreme
Court as being biased. Varat, supra note 6, at 319-20.
107. The Maryland opinion merely quoted the Simon "fairly traceable" test and made a
cursory summation that standing "clearly" existed. 101 S. Ct. at 2123-24.
108. Id. See notes 36-38 and accompanying text supra.
109. Under the "fairly traceable" test, actual injury may not be linked to defendant's
challenged action if the injury arises from an independent action of a third party. This third
party factor must be considered if the "fairly traceable" test is to be applied accurately. Simon
v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976).
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burden of the tax on to the consumers." 0 Therefore, the pipeline companies
and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, not the State of Louisiana,
were responsible for the economic injury to plaintiff states and their
citizens. Even the Maryland Court admitted that the consumers of natural
gas were only indirectly responsible to Louisiana for payment of the
taxes."' Consequently, there is an indirect causal connection between the
consumers of natural gas and Louisiana's imposition of the First-Use Tax.
When the injury is indirect, the analysis of the causation requirement
becomes more difficult. Although the indirectness of the harm does not
preclude the Court from granting standing to sue, the standing analysis
must explicitly delineate the causal link." 2 The Maryland opinion did not
explicitly articulate the causal connection, but instead summarily analyzed
the causation component." 3 Thus, the Maryland Court failed to establish
an adequate basis for its standing decision, thereby fostering judicial un-
predictability due to a lack of guidance for future application of the stand-
ing causation component.'"'
Original Juridiction Determination
Although the Maryland Court reached the proper conclusion with regard
to its grant of original jurisdiction, its application of discretion to review
exclusive original actions was unwarranted. As a result, the decision affects
the Supreme Court's role as an impartial tribunal." ' Developing a policy of
judicial discretion when statutory authority appears to set forth judicial
obligation ' 6 indicates that the Maryland Court is divesting its judicial
responsibility.'"
The fundamental purpose of exclusive original Supreme Court jurisdiction
is to ensure that actions between states be brought only before the nation's
110. See note 64 and accompanying text supra.
111. The Maryland opinion initially observed that consumers of natural gas incurred serious
injury as a direct result of the First-Use Tax. Inconsistent with the direct harm analysis, the
Court noted that the consumers were indirectly responsible to Louisiana for payment of the
taxes. The opinion's contradiction of direct harm and indirect responsibility evinces the need
for an explicit standing causation analysis in order to avoid confusion. See 101 S. Ct. at 2125.
112. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 504-05 (1975).
113. 101 S. Ct. at 2123-24. See note 107 and accompanying text supra.
114. The sacrifice of clarity and predictability in standing analyses is more than a sacrifice
of intellectual tidiness. It is a sacrifice of judicial resources. Varat, supra note 6, at 319-20.
Because the law of standing is "amorphous and confused," the ease of manipulation may pro-
duce unintended results. Tushnet, The Sociology of Article III: A Response to Professor
Brilmayer, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1698, 1705 (1980).
115. The Supreme Court is viewed as that "independent judicial branch, neutral as between
government and individual, class and class, party and party." R. JACKSON, THE SUPREME
COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 2 (1955).
116. See notes 44-52 and accompanying text supra.
117. Justice Stewart stipulated that the Supreme Court has a responsibility to exercise ex-
clusive original jurisdiction when the suit is properly invoked. California v. Texas, 437 U.S.
601, 606 (1978) (concurring opinion).
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highest tribunal.'' 8 In a suit between states, if the issues framed by the
pleadings constitute a justiciable controversy within the meaning of the con-
stitutional limitation,"' the Supreme Court has a responsibility to review
the case within its exclusive original jurisdiction. 2 0 Because the justiciability
requirement adequately protects the Court from the exercise of unwarranted
exclusive original jurisdiction, it was unnecessary for the Maryland Court to
undertake a discretionary analysis.'"' The Maryland Court, however, exer-
cised discretion to determine whether to review an exclusive original action
when judicial obligation was mandated.' 2
Resorting to a policy of discretion to review exclusive original cases sug-
gests that the Court was willing to divest its exclusive original jurisdiction.
The discretionary analysis focuses on the availability of alternative forums
in which to adjudicate the controversy.'23 In Maryland, the only alternative
forum for deciding the issues was in a state court of defendant Louisiana.' 4
Adjudication of the claim in a Louisiana court, however, contravenes the
rationale for Supreme Court exclusive* original jurisdiction involving suits
between states. The Supreme Court has recognized that a state should not
be compelled to resort to the tribunals of other states because parochial fac-
tors might result in the appearance, if not the reality, of preferential treat-
ment."' This fundamental policy mandates that the Supreme Court exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction without analyzing the availability of an alter-
native forum.
Discretionary limitations on exclusive original jurisdiction are unwar-
ranted. This discretionary policy is particularly disturbing when the discre-
tion appears arbitrary. In light of Arizona v. New Mexico,'2 6 the Maryland
Court's jurisdictional determination appears incongruous. Although
Maryland and Arizona involved nearly identical factual situations, the
Supreme Court reached contrary conclusions regarding the exercise of ex-
118. See note 14 supra.
119. In order to invoke the Supreme Court's exclusive original jurisdiction, plaintiff state
must demonstrate a justiciable controversy. Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660, 663
(1976). See notes 15-16 and accompanying text supra.
120. Justice Stevens expressed that the discretionary limitations of nonexclusive original
jurisdiction do not apply to actions under the Supreme Court's exclusive original jurisdiction.
Arizona v. New Mexico, 425 U.S. 794, 799 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring).
121. Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398, 405 (1939) (the justiciability doctrine guides determina-
tions pertaining to exclusive original Supreme Court jurisdiction). See also H.R. 2406, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). This bill was introduced to improve the administration of justice by
providing greater Supreme Court discretion in the exercise of its appellate function. The bill
proposes to repeal 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1976) and to modify 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254, 1257 & 1258
(1976). The bill, however, does not propose to change the status of the statute regulating
original Supreme Court jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (1976 & Supp. 111 1979).
122. 101 S. Ct. at 2126-28.
123. See note 56 and accompanying text supra. See generally Original Jurisdiction, supra
note 14, at 694-96 (discussion of the discretionary analysis in original jurisdiction cases).
124. 101 S. Ct. at 2125-26. See note 75 and accompanying text supra.
125. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 475-76 (1793).
126. ;425 U.S. 794 (1976) (pcr'curiam). See note 58 supra.
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clusive original jurisdiction.'" The Maryland Court justified the grant of
exclusive original jurisdiction by distinguishing the Arizona holding.'2 8 In so
distinguishing, the Maryland Court implicitly adopted a policy of discre-
tionary analysis without a basis in precedent.
In Maryland, the majority distinguished Arizona on three premises. The
first distinction concerned the availability of alternative state court forums.
The Maryland Court contended that the alternative Louisiana state court ac-
tions, unlike the alternative state proceeding in Arizona,'29 did not directly
represent the plaintiff states.' 30 From this distinction, the Maryland Court
concluded that the state proceedings would be inappropriate, and it must
therefore invoke exclusive original jurisdiction.' 3 ' The Arizona opinion,
however, stressed that the relevant inquiry was whether the issue could be
litigated in an alternative forum, not whether the litigants were directly
represented.' Consequently, the alternative forum distinction was applied
inconsistently.
The Maryland Court's second distinction was that, unlike the situation
presently before the Court, Arizona had not suffered any injury at the time
it moved to invoke exclusive original jurisdiction because the New Mexico
electrical energy tax had not yet been collected.' 33 In Maryland, the plaintiff
states suffered injury at the time they moved to invoke exclusive original
jurisdiction because the Louisiana tax on natural gas had already been
paid.' 3' This distinction, however, related to the justiciability limitation and
was not properly part of the jurisdictional analysis.'35 Because the
justiciability limitation adequately addressed the distinction involving
injury-in-fact, the Maryland Court's reliance on a discretionary jurisdic-
tional limitation was misplaced.
Finally, the Maryland Court distinguished Arizona by acknowledging that
"unique concerns of federalism" formed the basis for adjudicating the
Maryland controversy within Supreme Court exclusive original jurisdiction.' 3 6
The Supreme Court recognized that the First-Use Tax burdened federal Outer
Continental Shelf natural gas and conflicted with the federal regulation of
127. See notes 85-91 and accompanying text supra.
128. 101 S. Ct. at 2127-28. See notes 96-101 and accompanying text supra.
129. See note 88 supra.
130. 101 S. Ct. at 2127. See note 96 and accompanying text supra.
131. 101 S. Ct. at 2125-28.
132. See note 87 supra.
133. 101 S. Ct. at 2127. See note 98 and accompanying text supra.
134. 101 S. Ct. at 2128. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has allowed the
pipeline companies to pay the First-Use Tax to Louisiana and to collect and escrow the tax
from their customer's. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:1576(a) (West Supp. 1981).
135. Specifically, the question of whether injury has been suffered relates to the standing
issue. See notes 1-5 and accompanying text supra. Within the standing analysis is an element of
discretion; this discretionary concern provides the Court with judicial self-governance. Warth
v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-502 (1975). See notes 15-18 and accompanying text supra.
136. 101 S. Ct. at 2127.
19811
DEPA UL LA W RE VIEW
the Outer Continental Shelf.' 37 Although this is an important federalism
concern, this distinction departs from a fundamental policy underlying ex-
clusive original jurisdiction. Exclusive original jurisdiction depends entirely
upon the character of the parties, not upon the subject matter of the con-
troversy. '38 The majority's misconceived federalism distinction illustrates the
unprincipled application of a discretionary limitation applied to exclusive
original Supreme Court jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Maryland v. Louisiana, granting a state
standing to invoke exclusive original jurisdiction, failed to promulgate
sound judicial policies. The Maryland Court inadequately applied the stand-
ing causation inquiry to the factual situation. As a result, the decision com-
plicates the already confused status of the causation requirement. Moreover,
the Maryland decision demonstrates the Court's continued tolerance of in-
consistent standing principles.
Additionally, because the Court exercised discretion in deciding to hear
an exclusive original action, the decision reflects the Court's willingness to
divest its authority over exclusive original jurisdiction. Embracing this
discretionary policy may lead to arbitrary application of exclusive original
jurisdiction in future proceedings. Unfortunately, the Maryland decision's
inadequate standing analysis coupled with its unwarranted discretionary
analysis of an exclusive original action may impair the Supreme Court's ap-
pearance of evenhandedness.
Nancy E. Schiavone
137. Id. at 2128. The First-Use Tax burdens federal Outer Continental Shelf natural gas,
and conflicts with the broad federal regulatory scheme set forth in the Submerged Lands Act.
43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2) (1976) (state taxation laws shall not apply to the Outer Continental
Shelf).
138. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 378 (1821). The Court stated: "If [two
states are parties], it is entirely unimportant what may be the subject of the controversy. Be it
what it may, these parties have a constitutional right to come into [the Supreme Court]." Id.
at 378.
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